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"THE GREAT DIVORCE"1 OF GOVERNMENT
AND MARRIAGE:
CHANGING THE NATURE OF THE GAY
MARRIAGE DEBATE
I. INTRODUCTION
November 7, 2006, marks an important day for Wisconsin voters as they
will be voting on a state constitutional amendment that limits marriage to a
union between a man and a woman and that denies legal status identical or
substantially similar to marriage for unmarried individuals.2 Wisconsin
voters will not be the first voters in the fifty states to have been presented with
such a ballot. Within the past decade, nineteen states have passed similar
constitutional amendments, which, in general, limit marriage to a man and a
woman. 3 The trends indicate that once the proposed amendment reaches the
1. See C.S. Lewis, THE GREAT DIVORCE (1973); Vulcan's Mercy, The Great Divorce (With
Apologies to C.S. Lewis), http://localareawatch.typepad.com/vulcans-mercy/2006/04/the-greaLdiv-
or.html (last visited May 26, 2006).
2. S.J. Res. 53, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005). According to article XII, section 1 of the
Wisconsin Constitution, any amendment agreed upon by the majority of both houses shall pass first
consideration, but shall be agreed upon during a second consideration by the majority of both houses
in the next chosen legislature. WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1. If the amendment passes second
consideration, the legislature shall submit the amendment to the electors, who shall approve and
ratify it "by a majority of the electors voting thereon." Id. The constitutional amendment was first
considered and passed by the 2003-04 Wisconsin Legislature. Assemb. J. Res. 66, 96th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wis. 2004) (This resolution became Enrolled Joint Resolution 29). The senate passed the
constitutional amendment on its second consideration on December 6, 2005, S.J. Res. 53, 97th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005), and the legislature passed the constitutional amendment on its second
consideration on February 28, 2006, Assemb. J. Res. 67, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
3. The states are Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas,
and Utah. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (eff. Jan. 3, 1999); ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1 (rat. Nov.
4, 2004); GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, I (rat. Nov. 2, 2004); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (rat. Nov. 3, 1998)
(While the other constitutional amendments limit marriage to a man and a woman, Hawaii's
constitutional amendment reserves the right to define marriage to the legislature.); KAN. CONST. art.
15, § 16 (rat. Apr. 5, 2005); KY. CONST. § 233(A) (rat. Nov. 2, 2004); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (rat.
Sept. 18, 2004; eff. Oct. 19, 2004); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (rat. Nov. 2, 2004; eff. Dec. 18, 2004);
MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A (rat. Nov. 2, 2004; eff. Dec. 11, 2004); MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (rat.
Aug. 3, 2004); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 (rat. Nov. 2, 2004); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (rat. Nov. 2,
2004); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (ratified at the 2000 and 2002 general elections); N.D. CONST. art.
XI, § 28 (rat. Nov. 2, 2004); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (rat. Nov. 2, 2004); OKLA. CONST. art. II, §
35 (rat. Nov. 2, 2004); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5(a) (rat. Nov. 2, 2004); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (rat.
Nov. 8, 2005); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (rat. Nov. 2, 2004; eff. Jan. 1, 2005).
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voters by ballot, the amendment is passed easily, usually with a majority of
two-thirds or higher.4 However, while the trends demonstrate that state
constitutional amendments defining marriage are passed easily, the trends do
not demonstrate that the debates on these amendments preceding the vote are
non existent or non contentious. 5 On the contrary, the debate over same-sex
marriage is one of the most passionate debates in the United States today, and
many people feel very strongly about their positions.6
As Wisconsin voters prepare for the November 7, 2006, marriage
amendment ballot, they will be asking themselves and each other whether
they are "for" or "against" same-sex marriage. However, what if the answer
to this political question were "neither"? What if Wisconsin voters would not
limit themselves to one of two "sides" of the gay marriage debate, but instead
would gain a new perspective, a perspective that does not accept the premise
that government should be promoting and defining marriage? What if
Wisconsin voters would recognize that this proposed constitutional
amendment should not be put to a ballot; not because it violates the equal
protection of same-sex couples, 7 but because the question of who may marry
should be decided in the religious or cultural realm, not the political realm?
This Comment offers an alternative model of marriage, one that
recognizes the importance of government protection of marriage rather than
government promotion of marriage.8 Frederic Bastiat, a French philosopher,
once said, "If the law were confined to its proper functions, everyone's
interest in the law would be the same." 9 If government were confined to its
4. See Heritage Foundation, Marriage in the 50 States, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Fami-
ly/Marriage50/Marriage5OStates.cfrn (last visited Jan. 3, 2006) (reporting that of the nineteen states
to have passed constitutional amendments, only four states, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, and Oregon,
passed the amendments with less than a two-thirds majority).
5. See Stacy Forster, Marriage Vote on Track for Next Year, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov.
14, 2005, at lA (stating that "national groups on both sides of the issue are likely to pour hundreds of
thousands of dollars into Wisconsin to influence the amendment's outcome"). For examples of
organizations seeking to educate and influence others on their views, see Center Advocates, Inc.,
http://www.centeradvocates.org (last visited Jan. 3, 2006); Action Wisconsin, www.actionwisconsin-
.org/educate/marriage/resources.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2006); and The Family Research Institute of
Wisconsin, http://www.fri-wi.org/econnections/econnection_060305.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
6. See Forster, supra note 5.
7. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003) (asking whether a
marriage restriction "offend[s] the [Massachusetts] Constitution's guarantees of equality before the
law").
8. This Comment discusses a contractual approach to marriage, as endorsed by Gary Becker in
GARY S. BECKER & GU1TY NASHAT BECKER, Cut the Divorce Rate with Marriage Contracts, in THE
ECONOMICS OF LIFE 104, 105 (Susan Barry ed., 1997) (stating that "[w]e should replace judicial
determination with marriage contracts").
9. FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 17 (Dean Russell trans., Found. for Econ. Educ., Inc. 1950)
(1850).
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proper functions within the marriage context, government would no longer
promote marriage by conferring status or benefits on married individuals.' 0
As a result, everyone's interest in the laws of marriage would be the same:
same-sex couples would no longer be fighting for the political recognition of
marital status or for the right to marital benefits," and opponents of gay
marriage would no longer need to defend their notions of marriage in the
political realm. Rather, government would protect marriage-like relationships
through enforcement of private agreements. 12 As a result, people would no
longer debate about the morality of gay marriage in the political realm, and
the gay marriage debate would be transformed into a strictly religious,
philosophical, or cultural debate, leaving questions involving the institution of
marriage to individuals. 13
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of the nature and
history of the gay marriage debate, illustrating the effects of government
promotion of marriage. Part III sets forth an alternative marriage model along
with a discussion of its costs and benefits. Part IV illustrates the costs of
government promoting marriage and maintaining the status quo. Part V sets
forth a new vision of marriage and illustrates how the alternative marriage
model would strengthen the institution of marriage. Part VI concludes with a
brief illustration of the continuing unanswerable questions that government
will face if it continues to promote and define marriage, and it challenges the
reader to reconsider the political question of whether he or she is "for" or
"against" same-sex marriage.
II. HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE GAY MARRIAGE DEBATE
Both "sides" on the gay marriage debate appear to agree on at least one
premise: government should be involved in defining, promoting, and
regulating marriage. 14 While most individuals agree with this one premise,
10. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (stating that "[flor those who choose to marry, and for
their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social benefits").
11. See also In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004)
(stating that the civil union bill proposed in Massachusetts, while conferring marital benefits to same-
sex couples but not conferring marital status, "maintains an unconstitutional, inferior, and
discriminatory status" and "violates the equal protection and due process requirements of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights").
12. See BECKER & BECKER, supra note 8, at 105.
13. See Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of Gay Marriage (July 17, 2005),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/07/the law andeco.html; Edward Zelinsky,
Government Should Get Out of the Marriage Game, CONN. L. TRIB., July 26, 2004, at 23.
14. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954 (stating that "[c]ivil marriage is created and regulated
through exercise of the police power," and this police power is "express[ly] delegat[ed] ... from the
2006]
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they not only disagree as to the definition of marriage, but also as to which
government (state or federal) and which branch of government (legislative or
judicial) should define marriage. 15 Therefore, the nature of the gay marriage
debate may be characterized into three kinds of debates: (1) debates between
state legislatures and state judiciaries, (2) debates between state governments
and the federal government, and (3) debates amongst and between judiciaries.
First, debates arise between state legislatures and judiciaries.16  These
debates frequently follow the same pattern: state legislatures react to the
judiciaries' interpretations of state marriage laws and their constitutionality by
adopting measures, such as Defense of Marriage Acts ("DOMAs") 17 and
constitutional amendments 8 "intended to mitigate the likelihood of a judicial
redefinition of marriage."' 9  For example, in the 1990s, the Hawaii
Legislature rejected the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v.
people to their government"); EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS 105 (2004) (stating that
"the right to marry is, first and foremost, a legal matter" (emphasis in original)); see generally
GLENN T. STANTON & BILL MAIER, MARRIAGE ON TRIAL: THE CASE AGAINST SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND PARENTING (2004) (arguing against expanding the legal definition of marriage to
same-sex individuals).
15. See infra Part II.
16. Joshua K. Baker, Status, Benefits, and Recognition: Current Controversies in the Marriage
Debate, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 569, 573 (2004).
17. Numerous state governments and the federal government have passed DOMAs, which
typically provide that (1) marriage is the legal union between a man and a woman, and (2) a state
does not have to recognize marriages between same-sex individuals performed outside the state. See,
e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis 1998);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101(c), 25-112 (2000); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-107, 109, 208 (2002); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 308.5 (West 2004), held
unconstitutional by In re Coordination Proceeding, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar.
14, 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (2000);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 572-1, -3 (LexisNexis 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-201, -209 (1996); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1 1-1-1 (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 595.2 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.040, 402.045
(LexisNexis 1999); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89, 3520 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701
(2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 551.1, .2, .271, .272 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01
(West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2003); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(d) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01
(2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West
2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (2005);, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-1-1, -38 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2, -4 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
45.2 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.04.010, .020 (West 2005), held unconstitutional by
Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004), and
Anderson v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4,
2004); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (2004).
18. See amendments cited supra note 3.
19. Baker, supra note 16, at 573.
[89:795
"THE GREAT DIVORCE"
Lewin. In that case, the court found that the marriage law discriminated on
the basis of sex, and this discrimination required application of a strict
scrutiny analysis. E' When the trial court on remand found that the defendant
had failed to overcome his heavy burden of proof,22 the case appeared to
make Hawaii "the first jurisdiction in the world to officially recognize a
marriage between two persons of the same sex. ' , 2 3  However, the Hawaii
Legislature rejected the holding in that case, and on November 3, 1998,
Hawaii voters ratified a constitutional amendment that granted authority to the
legislature to "reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.
24
Second, debates arise between the federal government and the state
governments concerning which one has the right to define marriage.25 One
could argue that the United States Supreme Court answered this question in
Baker v. Nelson in 1972, when it dismissed the case involving the legitimacy
of the Minnesota marriage laws "for want of [a] substantial federal
question., 26  Nevertheless, the debate concerning states' rights to define
marriage continues to be an issue because of the re-introduced 2005 Federal
Marriage Amendment, which, if passed and ratified, would limit marriage to
the union of a man and a woman.27 Proponents of states' rights argue that
marriage is a state issue, and a federal constitutional amendment would
20. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see H.R. 117, S.D. 1, C.D. 1, Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 1 (Haw.
1997); Baker, supra note 16, at 581.
21. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 67.
22. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
23. Baker, supra note 16, at 580.
24. See H.R. 117, S.D. 1, C.D. 1, Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 1. (Haw. 1997) (stating, "The
Legislature shall have authority to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples"); see also Baker, supra
note 16, at 581.
25. See Bob Barr, Wedded Bliss? Constitutional Ban Would Undermine States' Rights,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Aug. 31, 2003, at Fl (stating that "[miarriage is a quintessential
state issue" and "[a] [federal] constitutional amendment is both unnecessary and needlessly intrusive
and punitive").
26. 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The United States Supreme Court would have faced this question
again in 2004; however, in Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 1002
(2004) (denying cert.), the Court declined to hear a case involving the proposition to overturn the
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), which
redefined marriage to include the union of same-sex individuals, id. at 969.
27. S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005). In 2003, the Federal Marriage Amendment was first
introduced in Congress, H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003), and an identical proposal was
introduced in the Senate, S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003). The amendment did not pass in either the
House or the Senate in 2004, failing by a 227-186 margin in the House in September and a 48-50
vote in the Senate in July. See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Protection Amendment,
http://www.hrc.org (follow "Marriage" hyperlink; then follow "Federal Marriage Amendment"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). The amendment was re-introduced in the Senate on January 24,
2005, S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005), and in the House on March 17, 2005, H.J. Res. 39, 109th
Cong. (2005).
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violate the principles of federalism by impinging on the states' rights to define
28
marriage.
Third, debates arise amongst members of judiciaries over the validity of
purported state interests and the level of scrutiny (strict scrutiny or rational
basis review) employed when reviewing equal protection challenges to state
marriage laws. 29 For example, when applying a rational basis review, some
courts find that the state interest in restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples is rational, mainly because the state has an interest in preserving the
institution of marriage as a union of a man and a woman to promote
"procreation and rearing of children within a family."30 Other courts find that
the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples is irrational because the
public role of marriage, such as "provid[ing] for the orderly distribution of
property [and] ensur[ing] that children and adults are cared for and supported
whenever possible from private rather than public funds," may still be carried
out by broadening the institution of marriage to include same-sex couples.3 '
In addition to debating the state interests and standard of scrutiny,
judiciaries also debate the constitutionality of civil unions, which afford same-
sex couples equal marital benefits without equal marital status.32 For
example, in Baker v. State33 the Vermont Supreme Court legitimized civil
unions when it held that Vermont is constitutionally required to extend to
same-sex couples the same benefits that are afforded to married couples.34
However, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did not agree when it
ruled that a civil union bill, which conferred the same marital benefits to
same-sex couples but denied them marital status, was unconstitutional.35
28. See Barr, supra note 25 (stating that "the Constitution is no place for forcing social policies
on states, especially in this case, where states must have the latitude to do as their citizens see fit").
29. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny standard);
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (applying rational basis review).
30. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971); see Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d
15, 25 (Ind. App. Ct. 2005) (stating that "[t]he institution of marriage not only encourages opposite-
sex couples to form a relatively stable environment for the 'natural' procreation of children in the
first place, but it also encourages them to stay together and raise a child or children together if there
is a 'change in plans' (footnote omitted)).
31. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
32. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
33. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
34. See id. at 867.
35. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 572. In a 4-3 decision, the
Goodridge court held that the state discriminated against same-sex couples "for no rational reason."
798 N.E.2d at 968. The court changed the common law definition of "civil marriage to mean the
voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others." Id. at 969. The court
remanded the case to the superior court but stayed the entry of judgment for 180 days to allow the
legislature to take any appropriate action. Id. at 969-70. When the Massachusetts Senate asked for
an advisory opinion from the court on the constitutionality of civil union legislation that confers all
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While the nature of the gay marriage debate in the political realm usually
centers around which branch of government should decide the definition of
marriage and what interests in marriage are most compelling, rarely does the
nature of the gay marriage debate focus on the individual's right to define
marriage. Instead of debating whether the state or federal government, or
whether the legislature or the judiciary, should decide the definition of
marriage, government should eliminate its interests in promoting marriage,
thereby allowing individuals: in the religious, cultural, and philosophical
realms to debate, decide, and regulate amongst themselves the definition of
36
marriage.
III. CHALLENGING THE STATUS Quo: AN ALTERNATIVE MARRIAGE
MODEL
A. Defining the Alternative Marriage Model
The alternative marriage model is based on the following premise:
government has a role in protecting the legal or commercial aspects of
marriage-like relationships through enforcement of private agreements,37 but
government has no role in defining or promoting marriage by conferring
status and benefits on married individuals. The alternative marriage model
recognizes that marriage has both commercial and non commercial
elements; 38 however, the alternative marriage model redefines marriage so
that marriage relates only to the non commercial elements of marriage,
the marital benefits to same-sex couples but not the status, the court responded that "the [civil union]
bill maintains an unconstitutional, inferior, and discriminatory status for same-sex couples." In re
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 572; Baker, supra note 16, at 586-87. In
response to this opinion, the Massachusetts Legislature passed the (marriage and civil union)
compromise amendment on March 29, 2003, which limited marriage to a man and woman, but
created civil unions and afforded same-sex couples the same benefits as married couples. H.B. 3190,
183rd Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003). During second consideration of this amendment, the
legislature voted against it, thereby eliminating the prospect of a marriage amendment appearing on a
statewide ballot in November 2006. H.B. 653, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); S.B. 5,
184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); see Raphael Lewis, After Vote, Both Sides in Debate
Energized, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 15, 2005, at Al. In what is called a ballot initiative process,
Massachusetts voters have now mobilized to gain enough petition signatures to start the process of
placing another proposed constitutional marriage amendment on the ballot in 2008. Raphael Lewis,
Petition vs. Gay Marriage Advances, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2005, at B1, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2005/12/22/petition-vs-gay-marriage-advances/.
36. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 23.
37. See BECKER & BECKER, supra note 8, at 105.
38. See Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 98 (2001) (stating that "perhaps we can conceive of intimacy that is
partly commercial and partly noncommercial").
20061
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thereby making marriage "solely a religious and cultural institution with no
legal definition or status. 39
B. Commercial and Non Commercial Elements of Marriage
Eliminating marriage as a legal institution would leave a significant gap in
the law governing married individuals. 40  This gap in the law would be
created because marriage has commercial or legal elements in addition to its
non commercial or religious elements.4 1  The non commercial elements
involve those things most commonly associated with the religious institution
of marriage: "mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.
42
The commercial elements of marriage involve those rights and services that
have market value, such as ownership of property 43 and "homemaking
services like cleaning, childcare, cooking, [and] carpooling." 4  These
commercial elements of marriage make "marriage different from other living
arrangements such as those involving roommates and live-in servants ' 45
because they involve notions of comparative advantage, with each spouse
specializing in what he or she does better than the other and both spouses
sharing in their returns.46
Because marriage involves this set-up of specializing and sharing, spouses
may benefit from establishing terms of a contract to define their expectations
and responsibilities.47 Government's proper role, accordingly, is to protect
this spousal relationship by enforcing private contracts between individuals. 48
Therefore, while government should not have any role to play in the
religious or non commercial elements of marriage, government should still
maintain its role in protecting and facilitating the unique contractual
relationship between married individuals.
39. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 23. An alternative marriage model would allow differing
religious thinkers, cultural groups, and individuals to "promulgate [their] own definition of marriage
in a world where the law does not define or regulate it." Id.
40. For a list of the many laws relating to marriage, see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-57 and
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993).
41. See Ertman, supra note 38, at 98.
42. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
43. See Lewin, 852 P.2d at 59.
44. Ertman, supra note 38, at 98.
45. Douglas W. Allen, "'hat Does She See in Him? ": The Effect of Sharing on the Choice of
Spouse, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 57, 57 (1992).
46. See id.
47. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARv. L. REv. 491, 505
(2005).
48. See BECKER & BECKER, supra note 8, at 105.
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C. Governmental Protection of the Commercial Elements of Marriage:
Reshaping Marriage Under Principles of Business Law
The commercial elements of marriage and other living arrangements have
many similarities to different business models. 49 For example, marriage is
similar to a close corporation; cohabitation is similar to a partnership; and
"polyamorous" relationships are similar to a limited liability company
("LLC").50 These similarities illustrate how business models may be used to
define, regulate, and protect the commercial elements of marriage,5 as well as
why applying business models to marriage would not represent a drastic
departure from the current law. 
52
Marriage, as defined today, is similar to a close corporation, especially
concerning formation, dissolution, and taxes.53 Corporations, like marriages,
may be formed for any lawful purpose, one of which usually includes profit
maximization.54 The formation of corporations and marriages also "requires
application to and certification from the state."
55
Corporations and marriages can also dissolve in much the same way.
56
For example, voluntary corporate dissolution is similar to no-fault divorce.57
Administrative corporate dissolution resulting from the corporation's failure
to fulfill statutory requirements is analogous to annulment. 8  Corporate
dissolution also "requires the formality of filing articles of dissolution, just as
divorce requires formal state action., 59 Shareholders also "divide assets upon
dissolution based on their percentage ownership, just as spouses divide assets
based on their ownership interest., 60  Corporations and marriages are also
taxed the same way in that both are taxed as separate entities.61
49. Ertman, supra note 38, at 101. This section seeks only to summarize the similarities
described in Professor Ertman's article.
50. Id.
51. See Posner, supra note 13 (stating that "[t]he analogy would be to partnership law, which
allows the partners to define the terms of their relationship").
52. See F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 561, 597 (stating that marriage and contract are quite comparable in that even today "private
contracting offers a method through which the parties might obtain many of the benefits of..
marriage").
53. Ertman, supra note 38, at 109, 112.
54. Id. at 117.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 118.
57. Id. at 118-19.
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 109.
2006]
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While marriage is similar to a corporation, cohabitation is similar to a
business partnership, especially concerning formation, dissolution, and
taxes. 62 "A business partnership is formed whenever two or more persons
operate a business for profit., 63 Likewise, when two people move in together,
the formal relationship begins, and presumably, the couple is "expecting to
benefit from the arrangement personally and economically."' 64 Also, unlike
the formation of a corporation or a marriage, formation of a partnership or
cohabitation does not require state action.65
Dissolution is also similar between the business partnership and
cohabitation because no judicial action is required to formalize the
dissolution.66 A business partnership dissolves when one partner leaves, just
like cohabitation typically dissolves when the partners break up.
67
Lastly, both partnerships and cohabitants "are taxed as disaggregated
groups," unlike corporations and marriages that "are generally taxed as
separate entities."
' 68
Polyamorous 69 relationships represent yet another living arrangement that
is similar to the LLC business model.7° "[T]he hybrid nature of LLCs (part
corporation, part partnership) mirrors the hybrid nature of many polyamorous
affiliations (which may include a marriage or other primary relationship
alongside relationships with more peripheral individuals). 71
These similarities between business models and living arrangements help
to show how applying the concepts of business law could reform the
institution of marriage without drastically altering it. As described in the
succeeding section, the LLC business model provides a useful example.
D. An Example of a Contractual Approach to Marriage Using the
Principles of Business Law: The Relationship Limited Liability Company
As illustrated in the preceding section, living arrangements, including
62. Id. at 103, 109.
63. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT art. 2, § 202(a) (1997); Ertman, supra note 38, at 103-04.
64. Ertman, supra note 38, at 104.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 107.
67. Id. at 107-08.
68. Id. at 109.
69. This term refers to "a wide variety of relationships that include more than one participant."
Id. at 124.
70. Id. at 127.
71. Id. LLCs will be discussed in greater detail in the succeeding section.
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marriage, are already very similar to existing business models.72 Therefore,
under the alternative marriage model, principles of business law would
regulate the commercial aspects of intimate relationships. Business models
could be created so that individuals may enter into legal relationships similar
to those created when individuals marry.73
Currently, some individuals, who are generally not married or are denied
the right to marry but still want to form a legal relationship between them,
have already turned to business law.74 These individuals are turning to what
has been termed the new marriage model, the Relationship LLC ("RLLC").75
An RLLC is a limited liability company 76 whereby particular assets are
pooled together to form a start-up business.77 The RLLC would function like
any other LLC regarding formation, membership, legal rights, liability, taxes,
and dissolution.
An RLLC may be formed by filing "Articles of Organization" with the
secretary of state.78 An operating agreement sets the terms of the legal
relationship and allows individuals to alter the default rules governing their
legal relationship.79
Unlike the current system of marriage or civil unions, membership in an
RLLC is not confined to individuals with sexual or intimate relations, but is
"available to everyone, couples (of any sexual mix) who wish to pursue life
72. Id. at 79.
73. See Relationship LLC, http://www.relationshipllc.com/main.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2006).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. LLCs are defined as the following:
Limited liability companies (LLCs) are noncorporate entities that are created
under special statutes that combine elements of corporation and partnership law.
As under corporation law, the owners (members) of LLCs have limited liability.
As under partnership law, an LLC has great freedom to structure its internal
governance by agreement. Like a corporation, an LLC is an entity, so that it
can, for example, hold property and sue and be sued in its own name. LLCs
come in two flavors: member-managed LLCs, which are managed by their
members, and manager-managed LLCs, which are managed by managers who
may or may not be members.
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCs 135 (3d ed.
2000) (italics in original).
77. See Relationship LLC, supra note 73.
78. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(a) (2005); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 202(a), 6A
U.L.A. 578 (1996); Ertman, supra note 38, at 128.
79. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2005); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(a), 6A
U.L.A. 567 (1996).
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together, a single parent family and groups of friends., 80  Like any LLC, the
RLLC may be managed by all of its members or a manager (who may or may
not be a member).81 The option of a manager-managed RLLC is amenable to
families with children because it allows the children as members to reap the
benefits of the legal relationship but vests the authority to act for the RLLC in
the parents as managers.82
Concerning the scope of its legal authority, the RLLC functions as a legal
entity that "could buy property, provide health insurance to its members,
obtain credit cards, serve as the couple's consulting company . . ., lease a car,
file a tax return as a partnership and[,] in general, engage in any legitimate
business. ', 83
Concerning liability, the members of the RLLC may decide how many
resources they would like to share, and none of the members would be
personally liable for the debts of the RLLC,84 unless the court "pierces the
veil."85  Therefore, instead of the default rules of marriage dictating what
property is community or separate, 86 individuals would choose how much
they would like to contribute to the company.87 In addition, the RLLC could
be taxed as a corporation or a partnership, depending on what the members
choose. 88
Concerning dissolution, LLCs often have perpetual lives unless dissolved,
80. See Relationship LLC, supra note 73.
81. See DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 6, § 18-402 (2005); UNiF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 404 (1996).
82. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(b)(1), 6A U.L.A. 588 (1996) (stating that in a
manager managed company, "[a] member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its
business solely by reason of being a member" and that "[e]ach manager is an agent of the company
for the purpose of its business"); but see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005) (stating that
"[u]nless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, each member and manager
has the authority to bind the limited liability company").
83. Relationship LLC, supra note 73; see UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 112(b), 6A U.L.A. 576
(1996) (stating that a limited liability company has the same powers as an individual such as the
power to sue and be sued, § 112(b)(1), deal with real or personal property, § 112(b)(2), and lend and
invest money, § 112(b)(6)).
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303(a) (2005); UNE. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 303(a), 6A
U.L.A. 590 (1996).
85. See Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'l Hosp., No. Civ. A. 95-4209, 1998 WL 283298, at *9 (E.D.
La. May 29, 1998) (finding that the limited liability company "veil" may be pierced under certain
circumstances, resulting in individual liability for its debts). A court may "pierce the veil," for
example, if the RLLC's members or managers were defrauding third parties or if the RLLC was
operating as the "alter ego" of the members. See id. at *10. In the case of an RLLC, courts would
probably be more apt to pierce the veil of protection because the nature of an RLLC entails a close, if
not identical, relationship between the members' personal and "business" activities.
86. See, e.g., WiS. STAT. ch. 766 (2003-2004).
87. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-501 (2005); UNiF. LTD. L1AB. CO. ACT § 401, 6A U.L.A.
592 (1996).
88. See TREAS. REG. §§ 301.7701-2(c)(1), 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2003).
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and the ownership interests are freely transferable.89 Perpetual life allows
couples that separate the opportunity to continue operating the RLLC if they
choose. Couples with children would most likely find this option favorable
because they could maintain their legal relationship for the benefit of their
children even after severing their intimate relationship. 90 In addition, freely
transferable interests would allow for easy exit, 9' and dissolution of the RLLC
would not require a "divorce-style proceeding in court," 92 thus saving time,
resources, and heartache. 93
While the RLLC is one alternative business model, individuals are not
limited to this model and may pursue other legal relationships through
contracting. Whichever model individuals choose to pursue, government's
proper function should be to protect and facilitate their private agreements.
94
E. Costs of the Alternative Marriage Model
Deregulating marriage and relying solely on individuals' freedom to
contract a marriage-like relationship creates some societal costs and
concerns. 95
Primarily, a system of law that encourages complex contracting, involving
the formation of business organizations, yields high transaction costs. 96 For
example, properly forming a business partnership or an LLC may cost
thousands of dollars and usually requires the assistance of an attorney. 97
However, proponents of the RLLC argue that RLLCs differ from general
89. Ertman, supra note 38, at 128; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(a) (2005); UNIF. LTD.
LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 501(b), 503(a), 6A U.L.A. 604-05 (1996).
90. See Relationship LLC, supra note 73.
91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(a) (2005); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 501(b), 6A
U.L.A. 504 (1996).
92. Rllc, http://www.rllc.net (last visited Jan. 14, 2006); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(a)
(2005); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 801, 6A U.L.A. 619 (1996).
93. See Divorce and Child Custody, http://www.nolo.com/index.cfin (follow "Family Law &
Immigration" hyperlink; then follow "Divorce and Child Custody" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 26,
2006) (stating that alternatives to courtroom proceedings for divorce reduce the cost and heartache
for everyone involved).
94. See Ryan Nishimoto, Marriage Makes Cents: How Law & Economics Justifies Same-Sex
Marriage, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 379, 383 n.28 (2003) (book review) (describing how although
law and economics theorists disfavor regulation, they welcome some government intervention to
enforce contracts).
95. This Comment will not discuss the public policy concerns, such as exploitation of women,
of applying the law governing economic exchanges to intimate relations. For a thorough discussion
on the legal regulation of economic exchange in marriages and the arguments for and against
legalized "commodification" of marriage, see Hasday, supra note 47.
96. Nishimoto, supra note 94, at 385.
97. Rllc, supra note 92.
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partnerships and LLCs in that they are simply startups with "seed" funds
invested in them; therefore, they are much easier to create and are commonly
created without an attorney. 
98
However, because not all individuals have access to the necessary
resources, statutory and common law would need to develop a system of
default rules 99 to reduce the high transaction costs associated with contract
formation. 100 Just as marriage laws provide default rules for those who do not
contract around them, 101 new laws could also provide default rules for those
who intend to, but do not, form a legal relationship. 102 For those individuals,
the law could provide a default legal relationship modeled on the laws of a
general partnership and based on an implicit agreement. 1
03
Society would also incur the costs of reforming the numerous laws that
currently rely on the definition of marriage to extend benefits to married
individuals. 04 For example, under the alternative marriage model, the default
rules regarding intestacy would need to be reformed to better reflect the
donative intent of each deceased individual. 105 In addition, the rules regarding
marital evidentiary privileges, qualifications to make medical decisions for an
incompetent or disabled spouse, and employee benefits would also need to be
reformed to reflect that the beneficiary may be one other than a spouse. 
106
These reforms may sound daunting and costly at first thought; however,
the current similarities between marriage and contract10 7 allow for a relatively
smooth transition from traditional marriage laws to alternative marriage
model laws. For example, in the area of employee benefits, laws could allow
each private employer the freedom to define "dependent" on its own terms.
For an employer that still wishes to provide employment benefits solely to
previously defined married individuals, the employer could use other indicia
besides a marriage license to determine which individuals qualify for
98. Id.
99. Summer L. Nastich, Questioning the Marriage Assumptions: The Justifications for
"Opposite-Sex Only" Marriage as Support for the Abolition of Marriage, 21 LAW & INEQ. 114, 162
(2003).
100. Nishimoto, supra note 94, at 385.
101. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ch. 766 (2003-2004).
102. See Posner, supra note 13.
103. See id.
104. See supra text accompanying note 40.
105. Nastich, supra note 99, at 163. For a thorough explanation on the increasing need to
reform intestate inheritance rights as cohabitation among unmarried couples becomes more common
in the United States, see E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance
Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REv. 255 (2002).
106. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956 (Mass. 2003).
107. See Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 52, at 597.
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dependent status, such as evidence of a religious marriage ceremony,' °8 a
marital-like contract between the employee and his or her partner, or a
declaration of commitment similar to the declaration required to gain
domestic partnership status in California.109 The only difference in the
declaration would be that instead of filing the declaration with the Secretary
of State, " 0 the employee would "file" the declaration with the employer. The
employer could then use these indicia of marriage-like status to determine
eligibility for dependent status. Any change in the marital-like relationship
would trigger certain provisions in the employment benefits plan, in the same
way that a divorce currently triggers certain provisions."'
108. See infra Part V.
109. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a), (b) (West 2004). When California passed the California
Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, A.B. 205, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2003) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005), it extended to "[r]egistered domestic partners . . . the same rights,
protections, and benefits ... as are granted to and imposed upon spouses." CAL. FAM. CODE §
297.5(a). To establish domestic partnership status, same-sex partners are required to file a
declaration with the Secretary of State, § 297(b), and must meet the following requirements at the
time of the filing:
(1) Both persons have a common residence.
(2) Neither person is married to someone else or is a member of another
domestic partnership with someone else that has not been terminated, dissolved,
or adjudged a nullity.
(3) The two persons are not related by blood in a way that would prevent them
from being married to each other in this state.
(4) Both persons are at least 18 years of age.
(5) Either of the following:
A. Both persons are members of the same sex.
B. One or both of the persons meet the eligibility criteria under Title
I1 of the Social Security Act . . . for old-age insurance benefits or
Title XVI of the Social Security Act ....
(6) Both persons are capable of consenting to the domestic partnership.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b).
One can imagine a system whereby private employers would condition the terms of an
employee benefits plan on the signing of a similar, albeit private, declaration, setting forth the
employer's particular eligibility requirements. This approach would, admittedly, raise equal
protection concerns as courts would no longer be able to distinguish heterosexual couples from
homosexual couples on the basis of marital status. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 482
N.W.2d 121, 129 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding, in part, that denial of insurance coverage to same-
sex partners did not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation but rather on the basis of marital
status; therefore, the denial did not violate the equal protection clause of the Wisconsin Constitution,
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1).
110. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b).
111. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 175, § 1101 (2000).
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IV. THE COSTS OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS Quo: MORAL HAZARD,
CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION, AND ADVERSE SELECTION
Although the costs of the alternative marriage model are significant, the
costs of continuing governmental promotion of marriage are also significant,
and society has much to benefit if these latter costs were eliminated. Just as in
any kind of wealth distribution scheme, when government provides benefits to
one class of individuals and denies the same to another class of individuals,
unintended consequences occur and inefficiencies result because the protected
class of individuals no longer must bear the full cost of its activities. 112 One
way to describe the reason for these unintended consequences is to analogize
governmental promotion of marriage to an example of a wealth redistribution
scheme, such as insurance. The terms used to explain the phenomena of
unintended consequences in the insurance realm are the terms associated with
a loss of social welfare: moral hazard, cross-subsidization, and adverse
selection. 113
A. The Concepts of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Cross-
Subsidization As They Relate to Insurance
In the insurance realm, moral hazard occurs when insureds change their
behavior by not investing efficiently in accident prevention. 114 Moral hazard
results because insureds do not have to bear the full cost of their activities but
pay only a premium that is usually less than the full cost of their activities.' 
15
Because insureds do not have to bear the full cost, they will not take proper
precautions, resulting in more accidents, higher total costs, and eventually
higher premiums. 116  Therefore, "all insureds end up paying more for
insurance and having more accidents than they would if they were required to
weigh the full costs to themselves."" 7
Cross-subsidization results when all insureds pay the same premium,
which leads to low-risk insureds funding high-risk insureds.1 8 The result is
112. See Nastich, supra note 99, at 126-28.
113. See Jon Hanson & Kyle Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic
Justification for Enterprise Liability, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 217,
218 (Avery Weiner Katz ed., 1998).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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an inefficient insurance regime." 9  A solution to the cross-subsidization
problem is to "charge insureds competitively according to their individual
risk." ' 20 However, due to asymmetrical or imperfect information, insurers do
not have the ability or the resources to calculate each insured's expected
damages and, therefore, cannot charge premiums according to each insured's
expected damages. 12
1
Adverse selection occurs "when potential insureds who know that they
pose above average risk 'self-select' into insurance pools, ' 122 resulting in a
"social welfare loss by raising the pool's average risk and thereby forcing
low-risk individuals to choose between paying disproportionately high
premiums or foregoing insurance."'
' 23
These phenomena of moral hazard, cross-subsidization, and adverse
selection are analogous to the problems associated with governmental
promotion of marriage. For purposes of this analogy, government is the
insurer, the high-risk insureds are married individuals, and the low-risk
insureds are unmarried individuals.
B. The Concepts of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Cross-
Subsidization As They Relate to Governmental Promotion of Marriage
When government promotes marriage by conferring benefits, such as
reduced tax liability, 24 on married individuals to the exclusion of unmarried
individuals, government is creating a moral hazard problem because married
individuals no longer have to bear the full costs of their activities. 125  Some
unmarried individuals, who would rather remain unmarried but for the marital
benefits, decide to become married individuals. 26 Cross-subsidization occurs
when the smaller pool of remaining unmarried individuals subsidizes the
married individuals through an increased tax liability. 2 7 The result is adverse
selection whereby the pool of married individuals increases, yet the pool of
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 220-21.
122. Id. at218.
123. Id. at 219.
124. See Nastich, supra note 99, at 151-52 (stating that "individuals in one readily identifiable
group, married people, receive significantly better treatment for the purpose of taxation than the
individuals in another readily identifiable group-unmarried people").
125. Cf id. at 129 (stating that "[d]istributing benefits and status through marriage creates a
perverse incentive for individuals to marry, even when they have no intention of maintaining a
permanent, monogamous, heterosexual relationship").
126. Id.
127. Cf id. at 152 (stating that "all taxpayers contribute financially to married couples").
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unmarried individuals still has to subsidize the married individuals. 128
C. Examples of the Unintended Consequences of Moral Hazard, Cross-
Subsidization, and Adverse Selection
Due to the dangers of moral hazard, cross-subsidization, and adverse
selection, governmental promotion of marriage is detrimental to society
because status and benefits are conferred on all married individuals, not just
those who help government achieve its societal goals. 129  Examples of
individuals who marry without helping government achieve its societal goals
are those who undergo sham or fraudulent marriages.'
30
Fraudulent marriages often occur when a United States citizen agrees to
marry a non United States citizen to help with immigration matters. 131 For
example, in Lanza v. Ashcroft,132 Ana Maria Lanza, a citizen of Argentina,
sought review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
denying her petition for asylum. 133 While the case was remanded for further
proceedings,1 34 the court noted Lanza's marriages to two United States
citizens. 135 Lanza testified that she had wanted to divorce her husband, Roy
Rowan, after having discovered he was having an affair; however, she heeded
Rowan's advice and did not pursue a divorce in order to remain
"protected."' 136 Rowan died of AIDS in 1996. 137 Although Lanza denied the
government's allegation that her first marriage was fraudulent, she admitted
128. Unlike in the insurance world where low-risk insureds can choose to forgo insurance
instead of paying the high premiums, Hanson & Logue, supra note 113, at 219, unmarried
individuals do not have this choice and must continue subsidizing married individuals, see Nastich,
supra note 99, at 152 (stating that "the current system of taxation obligates unmarried individuals to
pay for the economic benefits married couples receive").
129. Cf id. at 164. By promoting marriage and conferring benefits and status to opposite-sex
married couples, government encourages individuals to marry. Id. at 129. However, government
does not want just any unmarried heterosexual individuals to marry; it wants only those who will
help government achieve certain societal goals. Id. at 138. These goals include "encouraging
procreation to occur in a context where both biological parents are present to raise the child,"
Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-201 I-PL-001946, 2003 WL 23119998, at *5 (Ind. Super. Ct., May 7,
2003), "promoting the traditional family as the basic living unit of our free society," id. at *7, and
"protecting the integrity of traditional marriage," id. at *8.
130. Nastich, supra note 99, at 129..
131. See id. at 129-30.
132. 389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2004).
133. Id. at 919.
134. Id. at 936.
135. Id. at 921.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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that her second marriage to Willie Ray James was "one of convenience."' 38
While Lanza knew that James was gay and had been diagnosed with HIV, she
still married him, stating that the "primary purpose of the marriage was to
help her with her immigration problems."' 139 She also indicated that she had
paid him for his help. 1
40
Another example of a fraudulent marriage is the case of United States v.
Lee. 141 In that case, a man married a woman from the Philippines to prevent
her deportation. 142  In exchange for the marriage, the Filipino woman
compensated Lee, and "[a]ccording to plan, both he and his new wife then
went their separate ways immediately after the wedding and were divorced
about 6 months later."' 143 Lee also defrauded the Navy by accepting marital
benefits. 144
Finally, in Safadi v. Gonzalez, 145 the court denied Safadi's petition of
review of the BIA's order, 46 which denied his application for asylum.147 The
BIA had denied asylum partly because Safadi "had previously entered into a
sham marriage for the purpose of obtaining an immigrant visa," and this fact
weakened the credibility of Safadi's testimony. 1
48
These fraudulent marriages illustrate the concepts of moral hazard, cross-
subsidization, and adverse selection.149 In these cases, government, acting as
the insurer, provides benefits and status to married individuals. 150 People like
Lanza, Lee, and Safadi, who would otherwise not have been married but for
the marital benefits, get married. 15' Moral hazard results because, once they
are married, they no longer bear the full cost of their activities. Therefore,
Lanza, Lee, and Safadi become "high-risk" or married individuals, while
138. Id. at 921 n.5.
139. Id. at 922.
140. Id.
141. 43 M.J. 794 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995); see Nastich, supra note 99, at 130.
142. Id. at 796.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 148 Fed. App'x 372 (6th Cir. 2005).
146. Id. at 377.
147. Id. at 373.
148. Id.
149. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 113, at 218. These are examples of fraudulent marriages
that have actually been recognized in a court proceeding. Other incidents of fraudulent marriages
occur more often and may not always be subject to a court proceeding. For example, Terry
McMillan, a best-selling author, stated that she was divorcing her younger Jamaican husband "on the
grounds that he is gay, and had married her only to gain U.S. citizenship." McMillan's Rude
Awakening, THE WEEK, Oct. 14, 2005, at 12.
150. See Nastich, supra note 99, at 129
151. See id. at 129-30.
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"low-risk" or unmarried individuals are left to subsidize their activities.
Adverse selection occurs as the number of "high-risk" or married individuals
increases.
D. How the Alternative Marriage Model Eliminates the Unintended
Consequences of Governmental Promotion of Marriage
In the insurance world, the moral hazard costs associated with first-party
insurance result from a lack of perfect information about the insured's
expected accident costs. 152  To obtain such information, the insurer would
have to spend significant resources "analyzing the safety characteristics of
every consumer product and the consumption choices of every insured."'
153
Thus, the high costs of information gathering and the costs of monitoring
insureds' activity levels prevent insurers from charging a premium reflecting
each insured's expected accident costs. 154
Some argue that an enterprise liability system, whereby manufacturers are
held strictly liable for all accidents and bear the insurance burden, would be a
more efficient system. 55 The reason is that manufacturers are more efficient
than first-party insurers at gathering information and assessing the risks
inherent in their products.' 56 Therefore, under an enterprise liability system,
manufacturers "could adjust insurance premiums through the market price" by
adding the cost of the risk to the cost of the product. 157 In this way, the
insured buys the product at a cost that reflects a truer cost of the activity. 158
Like the problems with first-party insurance, the problems with
governmental promotion of marriage result from a lack of perfect information.
Government, like an insurer, faces high costs associated with information
gathering. For example, although fraudulent marriages like the ones
mentioned in Lanza, Lee, and Safadi are illegal, government must spend many
resources to gather information about these fraudulent marriages and to
monitor the status of these marriages.1 59  By offering marital benefits,
government seeks to promote stable and healthy relationships; 160 however, it
152. Hanson & Logue, supra note 113, at 220-21.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 221. For a more in-depth discussion refuting the notion that an enterprise liability
system leads to cross-subsidization and adverse selection, see id. at 222-24.
156. Id.
157. Id. at221.
158. See id.
159. See Nastich, supra note 99, at 130.
160. Id. at 138.
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does not have the capacity to monitor every couple's marriage to determine
that it is promoting societal goals. Therefore, government ends up charging
the same "premium" or conferring the same benefits to all married individuals
regardless of their achievement of societal goals. Because of imperfect
information, government cannot eliminate the moral hazard costs associated
with governmental promotion of marriage.
161
The alternative marriage model, however, would eliminate the moral
hazard costs associated with governmental promotion of marriage. Just as
under an enterprise liability system, the insurance company no longer
insures,1 62 under the alternative marriage model, government no longer
subsidizes married individuals through marital benefits and status. 163 Instead,
government allows married individuals to bear the full cost of their
activities. 164
In this way, the moral hazard, cross-subsidization, and adverse selection
costs would be eliminated because unmarried individuals would no longer
have the incentive to marry to gain legal benefits and status that they could
not gain as unmarried individuals.
V. WHAT REMAINS OF MARRIAGE AND HOW THE ALTERNATIVE
MARRIAGE MODEL STRENGTHENS THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE
Under the alternative marriage model, marriage is solely a religious or
cultural institution with no government recognition, definition, promotion, or
regulation.' 65 As a result, the debate about same-sex marriage would move
from the political realm into the religious and cultural realm, in which
161. Contra Nastich, supra note 99, at 142 (stating that if government truly wants to encourage
stable and loving relationships, government should "afford stable and loving gay, straight,
polygamous, and incestuous relationships the same social, economic, and legal treatment").
However, because government does not have perfect information concerning the stability of each
individual's relationship, the moral hazard costs will not be eliminated by affording benefits to
individuals in purported stable and loving relationships. This solution merely shifts differing
interests in the law from married versus unmarried individuals to individuals in a "stable"
relationship versus individuals not in a "stable" relationship. Therefore, government should stop
bestowing benefits and status on any class of individuals.
162. Hanson & Logue, supra note 113, at 221.
163. Therefore, under the alternative marriage model, the Domestic Partner Health Benefits
Act, S. 1360, 109th Cong. (2005), which proposes giving same-sex couples "the same tax breaks
married couples enjoy in purchasing health insurance," Jill Elswick, Employer Coalition Seeks
Benefits Tax Equity for Domestic Partners, EMP. BENEFITS NEWS, Jan. 2006, at 1, would be moot as
government would no longer be providing tax breaks for married individuals.
164. The analogy breaks down here as the married individual acts as both the high-risk insured
and the manufacturer.
165. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 23.
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different religions and organizations would define and regulate their own
conceptions of marriage.' 
66
Different forms of marriage would likely emerge, and the increase in
competitive forms of marriage would potentially strengthen marriage by
forcing individuals seeking to marry to consider the true meaning of marriage
(beyond the mere obtainment of a marriage license from the state) and then
subscribe to the form of marriage in which they believe.' 
67
For example, from a Christian perspective, marriage would be
strengthened because Christians choosing to marry would have to truly
consider the importance of a Christian marriage and its meaning set forth in
the Bible. 16' The focus of marriage, therefore, would shift from acquiring a
privileged legal status 169 to entering into a sacred covenant with their spouse
before God. 170  By focusing on this covenant, Christians would be able to
better practice their faith through fidelity and commitment in marriage
because they would feel ethically compelled to do so, 17 1 not because the state
compels them. In addition, people seeking answers to questions of morality,
such as the morality of same-sex marriages, would be forced to turn to their
faith and its teachings,172 rather than to government and its secular laws. The
166. See id.
167. See id. (describing increased competitive forms of marriage); Joshua L. Weinstein, A
Matter of State-and Church-The Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage Resounds Not Just in the Halls
of Government, But Also in the Churches and Synagogues that May-or May Not-Perform Such
Ceremonies, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 17, 2004, at IC.
168. According to traditional Christian perspective, "God himself is the author of marriage,"
Wilhelm Ernst, Marriage as Institution and the Contemporary Challenge to It, in CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES ON CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE 39, 47-52 (Richard Malone & John R. Connery eds.,
1984), and the purpose of marriage is for God to unite man and woman in one flesh, see Mark 10:6-
9.
169. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (stating that
"[flor those who choose to marry, and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal,
financial, and social benefits").
170. DAVID. M. THOMAS, CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE: A JOURNEY TOGETHER 22 (1983). Vatican
II began to describe marriage as a covenant between the wife and husband in an attempt to get away
from "the more traditional, but too restrictive, language of contract." Id. The Council thought that
the language of "covenant" would expand the theology of marriage because it would encourage "fill
focus on the persons involved rather than rights or services exchanged." Id. at 23.
171. See Ernst, supra note 168, at 52 (stating that the New Testament of the Bible envisions the
"definitive and irrevocable character of the pledge of fidelity in marriage as an ethical requirement
and not as an extrinsic, rigid law").
172. Under this new model, theologians could play an even greater role in shaping human
behavior and choices. For a description of what theology has to offer, see THOMAS, supra note 170,
at 25, who states the following:
Theology can then be thought of as having a very practical purpose. It should
use language accessible to all who might profit from its descriptions.
Unwillingness to avail oneself of the insights and directives of good theology
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increased study and research of one's faith thus strengthens the institutions
which that faith promotes.
Churches and synagogues in the United States have already begun to shift
the focus of marriage away from its legal meaning to its religious meaning. 
173
For example, a United Church of Christ congregation in New Hampshire no
longer conducts marriage ceremonies in the church. 174  Instead, it offers a
covenant ceremony for any couple that meets its requirements. 75 If the
couple is also interested in civil marriage, the congregation advises the couple
to perform the civil marriage at the city hall. 176 What happens in the church is
strictly a religious ceremony, thus eliminating the church's function as an
agent of the state. 177
The minister of this church emphasized that, sadly, "what makes a real
marriage for many people is not the religious ceremony, it's the piece of
paper." 178 He stated that covenant ceremonies encourage people to focus on
the things that really matter, such as "how do you sustain a committed
relationship?[;] [h]ow do you share your life fairly with another person?[;]
[and] [w]hat does it mean to love in the hard times as well as the easy
times?" 1
79
Under the alternative marriage model, these covenant ceremonies would
constitute the marriage ceremony. Churches, synagogues, and other religious
organizations would define marriage and would perform marriage ceremonies
only for those individuals who meet their requirements. The requirements for
marriage, therefore, would vary from church to church, and synagogue to
synagogue. 80
The new marriage model thus would strengthen the institution of marriage
by forcing individuals to focus on what truly matters in marriage instead of
raises the chances that one will embark on an errant life journey. One might
create all kinds of out-dated, silly, even harmful ideas about God and the human
situation. Theologians are not infallible; but when they responsibly exercise
their craft, what results is worth a hearing, particularly in areas touching
everyday life.
Id.
173. See Weinstein, supra note 167.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. For example, certain requirements could be set like those of a rabbi of the Temple Beth El
in Oregon, who has also performed commitment ceremonies like the pastor in New Hampshire: she
will officiate a same-sex commitment ceremony, but she will not officiate an interfaith commitment
ceremony. Id.
2006]
MARQUETTE LA WREVIEW
focusing on obtaining a certain legal status and benefits from the
government. 181
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has sought to provide a brief overview of the nature and
history of the gay marriage debate and to discuss an alternative marriage
model that recognizes government's role in protecting marriage-like
relationships but not in promoting marriage.
The gay marriage debate usually centers around the competing interests of
(1) state legislatures and judiciaries, (2) state governments and the federal
government, and (3) differing state judiciaries. However, rarely does the gay
marriage debate focus solely on the interests of individuals. Under the
alternative marriage model, the gay marriage debate would not disappear
completely; however, the debate would disappear from the political realm,
leaving individuals to debate gay marriage in the religious and cultural realm.
Government would be left with the role of enforcing contractual relationships
amongst individuals, while individuals in the religious and cultural realms
would be left to define marriage and to perform marriage or covenant
ceremonies. While significant costs are associated with reforming marriage,
reform would eliminate the moral hazard costs associated with any type of
wealth distribution scheme such as governmental promotion of marriage.
In addition, if reform is not undertaken, the gay marriage debate will
become only more controversial as technology creates additional situations
that government does not have the capacity to solve. 182  Legislatures and
judiciaries will no longer be deciding merely whether same-sex individuals
may marry each other, but they will also be facing questions such as the
gender of a transsexual for purposes of the marriage laws. 183 As technology
progresses, judiciaries and legislatures 184 will continue to expend more and
181. See id.
182. Without commenting on the merits of the Court's logic in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), the author would like to underscore that this situation would not be the first one where
government has conceded its incapacity to answer certain questions. See id. at 159 (Responding to
the question of when life begins, the Court noted, "When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point
in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.").
183. See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). This issue has faced
the Florida court in Kantaras v. Kantaras, stating that, for the purposes of the marriage statutes, the
biological sex of a transsexual is determined by the biological sex of the transsexual at birth. See id.
at 161. Therefore, the plaintiff in the case, who was "a postoperative female-to-male transsexual
person" could not "validly marry a female under the current law of [Florida]." Id. at 155.
184. See id. at 161 (stating, "Whether advances in medical science support a change in the
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more time and resources deciding these unanswerable questions. These
questions are best left to individuals, religious thinkers, and philosophers, not
government.
Therefore, as Wisconsin voters prepare for the vote on the constitutional
marriage amendment, they should ask themselves whether there are truly only
two answers to the political question: Am I, and are you, for or against same-
sex marriage?
CYNTHIA M. DAVIS
meaning commonly attributed to the terms male and female as they are used in the Florida marriage
statutes is a question that raises issues of public policy that should be addressed by the legislature").
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